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 There is a general consensus building that historically high fuel prices and greater public 
awareness of the emissions that result from burning fuel are going to be long-term concerns 
for those who design, build, and operate airliners. The possibility of saving both fuel and 
reducing emissions has rekindled interest in breaking very long-range airline flights into 
multiple stages or even adopting in-flight refueling. It is likely that staging will result in 
lower fuel burn, and recent published reports have suggested that the savings are 
substantial, particularly if the airliner is designed from the outset for this kind of operation. 
Given that staging runs against the design and operation historical trend, this result begs for 
further attention. This paper will examine the staging question, examining both analytic and 
numeric performance estimation methodologies to quantify the likely amount of fuel savings 
that can be expected and the resulting design impacts on the airliner. 
Nomenclature 
D = Drag 
L = Lift 
MTOW = Maximum Takeoff Weight 
MZFW = Maximum Zero Fuel Weight 
OEW = Operating Empty Weight 
PRE = Payload Range Efficiency, R*WP/WFB 
R = Range 
SFC = Specific Fuel Consumption, WFB/(T*tB) 
T = Thrust 
tB = time, Block 
TOW = TakeOff Weight 
V = Aircraft Velocity 
VEMPX = Nangia Emissions Efficiency parameter 
VEOPX = Nangia Value Efficiency parameter 
WFB = Weight of Fuel, Block, the fuel consumed over a flight 
WFR = Weight of Fuel, Reserve 
WFTOT = Weight of Fuel, Total, the fuel loaded onto the aircraft 
WP = Weight of Payload 
X = Linear coefficient of the Breguet Range Equation, V*L/(SFC/D) 
ZFW = Zero Fuel Weight 
I. Introduction 
CONSENSUS is building that both aircraft manufacturers and airlines are facing an ever more difficult future. 
Dramatically rising fuel prices and the possibility of new regulations to limit Global Climate Change are 
altering the balance of priorities that have shaped the airliner’s design and operation until now. These changes are 
driving a fresh reassessment of the characteristics desired when providing long-range air transportation. Recently, 
the possibility of altering both the design and operation of large airliners away from the historical trend of ever 
increasing stage lengths to that of a series of short stages has been proposed.  
In his paper titled “Efficiency Parameters for Modern Commercial Aircraft,”1 R.K. Nangia builds upon the work 
of J.E. Green2-3 and proposes two main hypotheses. The first is that approximately half of the fuel used when flying 
long ranges in one stage can be saved if the trip is broken into three stages and the aircraft is redesigned for this 
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operation. The second is that a new metric, or figure of merit, should be used to ensure that aircraft designs reflect 
the coming reprioritization of desired characteristics.  
This paper will examine both hypotheses using significantly different methodologies and data sources and will 
present all of the results in context.  
II. Staging Long-range Airline Service 
There has always been a demand for very long-distance travel. For most people throughout history, the cost and 
inconvenience of the travel modes available at the time has meant that this demand has gone mostly unfulfilled. 
However, as the relative cost and average speed of the available travel modes have improved, more people have 
chosen to take these long trips. When the aircraft was first introduced, the technology was too immature to meet any 
significant demand. The aircraft were not capable of carrying passengers far enough, fast enough, or economically 
enough to entice many people to choose them over other available modes or even to make the trip at all. Aircraft 
technology improved rapidly, but still, there were short periods of time when the technology didn’t allow for single 
stage service and airlines were willing to make significant operational concessions to enable very long-range travel.  
While there are many historical examples of multiple stage service up and down the American continents, one 
could argue that each stop along the way was a destination in and of itself, and so doesn’t technically count as 
staging.  
However, a clear example case of staging, where a minority of stages could be justified as demanded travel, has 
occurred. In 1935, Pan American Airlines instituted their “China Clipper” passenger and airmail service from San 
Francisco, CA, to Hong Kong, China.4 The Martin M-130 flying boat was nowhere near capable of making the trip 
in one stage, and the obvious option of following the continental coastline added so much distance that both time 
and cost were unappealing. Fortunately, the Pacific Ocean does have a few small islands at regular intervals, more or 
less along a line from San Francisco to Hong Kong. Pan American absorbed the cost of building and operating 
service bases at these remote islands in order to capture the available demand until the start of WWII forced the 
cessation of operations. The route had six stages, namely San Francisco to Honolulu, to Midway, to Wake, to Guam, 
to Manila, and finally to Hong Kong. This operation shows that an airline is willing to adopt even extreme forms of 
staging if it makes economic sense. During the intervening war years, aircraft technology improved dramatically, 
making this kind of operation unnecessary to service the demand. 
Another example of the extremes that airlines are willing to consider is the British Shorts company’s attempt to 
build a staged airliner for Imperial Airways.4 The Atlantic Ocean does not have the evenly spaced islands that the 
Pacific Ocean does, making the option of landing to refuel much less attractive. Instead, Shorts designed and tested 
the Mercury-Maia composite aircraft, which was literally a small seaplane attached to the top of a much larger flying 
boat. The Maia would takeoff with the Mercury attached above and give the Mercury a good flying start so that it 
would be able to begin the trip with a useful load with which it was physically incapable of taking off. 
Unfortunately, the Mercury-Maia operation proved uneconomical and was abandoned. It wasn’t until the Boeing 
314 Clipper came into service that there was an aircraft capable of crossing the Atlantic Ocean with the right 
combination of speed, range, and economy, but it did so in a single stage.  
Clearly, airlines are willing to consider unusual operations, including staging, if it captures travel demand at a 
profit. Currently, there are few staged airline operations, and these are relegated to only the longest of routes, such as 
London, UK to major cities in Australasia or New York, USA to cities in India.  
Nangia correctly observed that the historical trend has been towards ever greater stage lengths. Jenkinson reports 
that the average international stage length had increased steadily by a total of 84% between 1960 and 1990.5 This 
trend appears to be driven by fundamental market forces, and so will probably continue until the ultimate goal of 
single stage to any city pair in the world is a reality.  
Both Green and Nangia have suggested that the new realities of high fuel prices and Global Climate Change are 
making this kind of operation unsustainable and that the strategy of staging long-range service can save a great deal 
of fuel as well as the emissions that come from burning it. 
A. Analytic Analysis and Results 
Both Green and Nangia have developed analysis methods that are based on the Breguet Range Equation. I won’t 
go into detail about the analysis here, as the original papers do a much better job of outlining it than I would.1-3 What 
is important to understand about their methods is that they rely heavily on very coarsely correlated historical data, 
non-dimensionalization to reduce variation due to scale, and averaged values to reduce variation due to state changes 
over time. This is a classic analytic approach that seeks to make an analysis tractable by reducing the data and 
computational resources required.  
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Both applied their analytic methods to the question of fuel efficiency as a function of range, on a hypothetical 
479 passenger aircraft required to complete a total trip distance of 15,000 km. The analysis was done for aircraft 
designs that performed both one stage and three stage operations. Each aircraft was specifically designed for the 
stage lengths required, specifically 15,000 and 5,000 km respectively.  
Green’s analytic method indicated that making the trip in one stage, instead of three, required Operating Empty 
Weight (OEW) to increase by 41%, TakeOff Weight (TOW) to increase by 76%, and Weight of Fuel, Block (WFB) 
to increase by 40%. These are relative measures, which illustrate important relationships, but it is also illustrative to 
have some absolute measures for further comparison as well. The metric used by Green and Nangia, Payload Range 
Efficiency (PRE), is a good measure of fuel efficiency and, with a few unit conversion factors applied, is equivalent 
to the commonly used Seat-Nautical Miles per Gallon metric. It is important to realize that the PRE is an average 
value over the stage length, and so is only accurate for the stage length in which it was calculated. Green’s results 
for PRE are that the single stage aircraft attained 5,581 km, while the three stage aircraft attained 7,832 km. 
Nangia reported that he found a few errors in Green’s analysis and corrected them in his own analysis. Nangia’s 
analytic method indicated that making the trip in one stage, instead of three, required OEW to increase by 126%, 
TOW to increase by 125%, and WFB to increase by 103%. Nangia’s results for PRE are that the single stage aircraft 
attained 3,944 km, while the three stage aircraft attained 8,000 km. Figure 1 shows both Nangia’s and Green’s 
results for PRE as a function of aircraft design range. 
 
Figure 1. Payload Range Efficiency as a function of Design Range from Green and Nangia. 
 
Despite some disagreement about the actual values of the single stage penalty, both analyses indicate that the 
penalty is substantial. If correct, these results indicate that changing the design and operations of large, long-range 
airliners to multiple stages would have a large positive impact on fuel consumption, operational cost, and emissions. 
The larger this impact is, the more likely that any negative aspects of staging would be more than outweighed; so 
accurate quantification is crucial. 
B. Numeric Analysis and Results 
I applied the standard conceptual design approach used at NASA Langley for the evaluation of new 
technologies, configurations, and operations of aircraft. This involved collecting publicly available reports and data, 
formulating the analysis plan, choosing a validation aircraft for tuning the analysis to an accepted standard, 
redesigning to a baseline aircraft from which to base relative comparisons, performing many redesigns to populate a 
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database, understanding the results in the database, redesigning to correct mistakes, and finally reporting out the 
results with interpretations that are relevant for the intended audience.  
The method used for redesign is a computer program named FLOPS (Flight Optimization System).6-8 It is an 
aircraft design synthesis code that breaks historical data and engineering methods down to fine detail and captures 
the multi-disciplinary interactions of these analyses through a time step integration over a mission. FLOPS has the 
ability to optimize an Objective function subject to equality and inequality constraints through a list of design 
variables under the designer’s control. This is a capability far beyond simple resizing. Resizing is the act of 
converging to a new, self-consistent design. For any given set of requirements, there may be many such designs 
possible. Constrained optimization is a process by which the design space is explored and the best design, as defined 
by the Objective function, is reported out as the solution, while ensuring validity through the specified constraint set.  
This numeric analysis approach has several advantages over the analytic approach besides the ability to 
optimize. The single biggest advantage is that the simplification through non-dimensionalization and averaging 
takes place at the lowest levels in the analysis, which allows a much more complex recombination of characteristics 
to be analyzed. With the analytic approach, the method tends towards overgeneralization because the details that 
determine the values are obscured. The values are only valid over the range of variation of the vehicles that were 
used to determine them and frequently the designer is unaware of the ranges of validity. In cases where new vehicles 
are being evaluated, if the characteristics, or any combination of characteristics, fall outside of the validity range of 
the database, then there is a real possibility that the analysis will yield incorrect results. The numeric approach, on 
the other hand, still suffers from some of the same database dependencies as the analytic methods, but by breaking 
the analysis down into much smaller and more detailed pieces, the numeric approach is able to assemble the results 
to cover combinations of parameters that do not exist in the original databases. Another advantage is that the detail 
available makes the result more transparent. Knowing why an answer is coming out the way that it is can be as 
important as knowing what the answer is. Having the finer detail available aids both in assessing the validity of the 
answer as well as understanding what may be driving the answer. 
While the type of approach used will not guarantee that any given answer will be accurate, I believe that the 
numeric approach provides the best chance at correctly answering questions such as what are the potential benefits 
of staging airliner service?  
1. Research and Planning 
The hypothesis that there are large benefits from the staging of long-range airliner service has been most 
prominently espoused by Green and Nangia. Since all analysis methods and models are simplified representations of 
reality, they inevitably contain errors and comparing results from different analyses can be inconclusive. I did not 
want the veracity of this study to hinge on the reputations of the individuals or the heritage of the methods. Instead, I 
felt that the core of their hypothesis could be best approached by determining a minimum benefit using methods 
with no modeling error, then tuning an existing conceptual model to minimize modeling error, accepting the 
validation vehicle as the baseline vehicle, and finally performing a series of redesigns for populating the database.  
In this case, using published data for existing aircraft required no modeling, and so was free from modeling error. 
The computer model that I used for the redesign cases did have error, which I then minimized through calibration. 
2. Validation Vehicle 
After identifying that the characteristics desired for the study were the capability of very long-range operations 
and carrying a large payload; and deciding that a modern twin-engine configuration would be most relevant, I chose 
the Boeing 777-200 with the High Gross Weight Option model of airliner for validation. While smaller than the 470 
passenger vehicles chosen by Green and Nangia, the B777-200HG is capable of carrying 305 passengers in a 3-class 
configuration the full 15,000km. Since it is at Maximum Takeoff Weight (MTOW) at this condition, the B777-
200HG can be considered a near-optimal, modern, twin-engined validation aircraft for the analysis at this stage 
length. Unfortunately, the B777-200HG is substantially over designed for the 5,000 km range, making it a poor 
choice for validation at that stage length.  There weren’t any aircraft available at this short range that met all of the 
traits necessary for a validation aircraft. The closest was the Boeing 737-900. The B737-900 is a significantly 
different aircraft, being more cramped (2 class seating), smaller, slower, and having a much less advanced engine. 
Still, it is almost capable of making the 5,000 km range with 177 people on board and represents a real data point for 
an airliner designed to this short range. While it can’t be considered a validation aircraft, it can be used as a less 
conclusive, but significant reference aircraft. Figure 2 shows the PRE for of these existing aircraft over the ranges of 
interest. It is important to note that there is no possibility of modeling error in these values. It is also important to 
note that these results are conservative as there is no redesign from one range to the next. 
Figure 3 shows the payload/range diagram of the B777-200HG, along with the combinations of payload and 
range used.9 Similar diagrams were used for all of the Boeing vehicles in the study.10,11 
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Figure 2. Payload Range Efficiency as a function of Design Range for Existing Boeing Aircraft. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Payload as a function of Stage Length for the Boeing 777-200HG. 
 
I utilized a FLOPS B777-200 conceptual design model that was created for a previous study. The model will 
execute an optimization where the Objective is to minimize TOW by modifying the design variables of wing area 
and engine thrust, while maintaining validity with many constraints. Examples of active equality constraints are 
constant payload weight and makeup, passenger comfort, stability and control, and technology level. There are many 
inactive inequality constraints, any of which may become active as the design space is explored, but the most 
important inequality constraint is the active second segment climb gradient that is required by Federal Air 
Regulations and is sizing the wing area and engine thrust. The model required minor tuning in order to accurately 
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reflect the published Boeing values for TOW, OEW, and Weight of Fuel, TOTal (WFTOT). Given the lack of 
detailed weight, aerodynamic, and propulsion calibration data, it is not possible to accurately assign calibration 
factors to individual sources of error. This means that judgment needs to be applied to make the adjustments without 
significantly impacting the underlying trends during redesign. Two errors needed to be reduced during calibration.  
The first error was that the model’s OEW was approximately 1% light, so I decided that distributing a 3% 
increase across the wing, fuselage, tails, and landing gear weights, would be a neutral way of accounting for this 
error. This strategy was used because experience has shown that these items are more likely to be in error to this 
degree than the other items that make up the OEW and that distributing the error evenly would not unduly change 
the underlying weight trends. 
The second error was that the model was consuming too much fuel. It is difficult to determine the source of the 
discrepancy, because there are several factors that can affect fuel consumption, and the lack of reliable detail data 
meant that the cause could not be accurately isolated. Rather than leaving the error in, I decided that reducing the 
overall fuel consumption estimate by 7.7% was the best strategy available. Since this correction represents a slope 
change, it does alter the underlying trend somewhat, but experience has shown that this is the best way to calibrate 
regression models.   
With these two changes, the FLOPS model matched the validation vehicle very well.    
3. Baseline Vehicle 
In most studies, the validation vehicle can’t be used as the baseline for comparison because it doesn’t meet 
mission requirements and/or doesn’t have the right level of technology. This usually means that the validation 
aircraft is redesigned in a series of steps to become an optimal and valid design for the mission requirements and 
technology timeframe specified. In this study, the validation vehicle is perfectly adequate to answer the question at 
hand and fits the range and technology level that both Green and Nangia used. There is a small issue in that my 
model only carries 65% of the passengers, which does introduce inconsistency due to scale effects.  
 
Figure 4. Payload Range Efficiency as a function of Design Range for Hahn Optimistic Redesigned aircraft. 
 
4. Populating the Database 
The first task was to evaluate the Boeing 777-200HG over the ranges desired to establish the minimal benefit 
available from staged operations using existing aircraft. Using the published OEW and calculating the Weight of 
Payload (WP) based on the number of passengers and 95.3 kg (210 lb) for each passenger with baggage, the Zero 
Fuel Weight (ZFW) can be calculated. Where the ZFW line crosses each range line, a TOW can be found from the 
payload-range diagram (Fig. 3). The difference between ZFW and TOW is the Weight of Fuel, Total (WFTOT), 
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which includes the Weight of Fuel, Reserve (WFR). Since PRE is calculated using the WFB, the WFR must be 
subtracted from WFTOT. The payload-range diagram does include reserve fuel in the TOW, but doesn’t state what 
the WFR is. I chose to use the WFR/MTOW regression from Nangia, which appears to be approximately constant at 
4.4%, to estimate WFR for each stage length. The PRE was then calculated at each stage length. (Fig. 2) 
The second task was to establish any additional benefit available from a redesign from the high-confidence 
baseline. I performed an optimal sensitivity using FLOPS at design ranges of 5,000 and 15,000 km. An optimal 
sensitivity is when an individual constraint is changed and the vehicle is re-optimized. This analysis yields better 
results than the common sensitivity practice, because a new best design is found while maintaining validity through 
maintaining all constraints. The common sensitivity practice is merely a resizing of the design, which does not 
guarantee validity or optimality. Figure 4 shows that after calibration, the Hahn Optimistic Redesign 15,000 km 
aircraft has the same PRE as the validation aircraft, as intended.  
Figure 4 also shows that the redesigned 5,000 km aircraft is an improvement over the clearly non-optimal 
Boeing 777-200HG, which is as expected. It is also somewhat of an improvement over the reference Boeing 737-
900. While a welcome outcome, there is no obvious relationship that should exist, so no definite conclusion can be 
made from this observation other than to say that it is in the reference’s neighborhood. 
 
 
Figure 5. Four View Geometry Comparison between Boeing 777-200HG and Hahn Optimistic Redesign 
aircraft. 
 
5. Understanding Results 
After examination, I noticed that there was a problem with the model that became obvious only at the short stage 
length. The model uses a fixed set of Tail Volume Coefficients to size the vertical and horizontal tails. These 
coefficients are much more sensitive to changes in wing geometry than fuselage geometry, and since the fuselage 
geometry was fixed, the tails were tracking the wings as they shrank. Even a cursory examination reveals that this is 
an unrealistic behavior and that the optimization was being more strongly driven to small wings and tails than it 
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should have been. (Fig. 5) This meant that the potential benefits through redesign were being significantly 
overstated. This design was overly optimistic, and so will be referred to from now on as the Hahn Optimistic 
redesign. 
 
 
Figure 6a,b. Morris and Ashford Tail Volume Coefficient Correlation with Geometry Parameter. 
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6. Correcting Errors 
This unrealistic tail sizing is a common problem that can be addressed through a better method of conceptual tail 
sizing devised by Morris and Ashford of Douglas Aircraft.12 Figures 6a and 6b show the Douglas method, which 
amounts to a correlation between Tail Volume Coefficient and a non-dimensional geometric parameter. As one can 
see, the validation aircraft, the B777-200HG, falls in line with the correlation, whereas the Hahn Optimistic redesign 
is far from acceptable. Through iterative manual sizing of the tails, I was able to bring the Tail Volume Coefficients 
into similar positions to the trend lines as the validation aircraft.   
Figure 7 shows a top view of the Hahn Optimistic redesign on 
the left and the Hahn Realistic redesign on the right. The first item 
of note is that the tails on the Hahn Realistic redesign are indeed 
smaller than those on the validation aircraft, but not nearly as small 
as those on the Hahn Optimistic redesign. This is because, while the 
wing is substantially smaller, the fuselage has not changed at all and 
so it has the same polar moment of inertia and destabilizing 
influence that it had on the calibration aircraft, whose tails were 
sized by far more sophisticated methods and had passed 
certification trials. Tail Volume Coefficient is insensitive to these 
issues and so tends to undersize the tails. The second item of note is 
that the wing of the Hahn Realistic redesign is much smaller than 
that of the validation aircraft, but slightly larger than that on the 
Hahn Optimistic redesign. This is because the optimizer was able to 
reduce the Objective on the Hahn Optimistic redesign more by 
reducing the wing-tail combination, even if the wing was 
individually less efficient. Since this effect is greatly reduced on the 
Hahn Realistic redesign, the wing needed to be more efficient and 
so was made larger.  
The scale of the impact on PRE from proper tail sizing was 
surprising. Using the B777-200HG at 5,000 km as the basis for PRE 
without redesign, then the Hahn Optimistic redesign indicated that 
there was as much as a 26% improvement available for exploitation. 
The Hahn Realistic redesign indicates that only 16% is actually 
available, which is a drop in potential of 38%. (Fig. 8) 
This example illustrates some of the advantages of the Numeric Analysis approach. The transparency promoted 
by the detailed buildup allowed a significant error to be caught, and the understanding provided gives confidence 
that the model is performing well. Also, the method is able to balance different characteristics that may not have 
existed in the original regression data in this proportion. 
C. Comparison Of Outputs, And Interpretation 
Using PRE as a metric for comparison across all three studies, it can be seen in Fig. 9 that there is a great deal of 
difference in opinion between Green, Nangia, and Hahn as to what the potential benefits are from staging.  
The Boeing aircraft are the only aircraft considered in this paper whose predicted performance is free from 
modeling error. Since the B777-200HG can just meet the 15,000 km stage length at its MTOW, it can be considered 
to be nearly optimally designed for this combination of range and payload. At the 5,000 km range with the same 
payload, the aircraft is operating considerably below its MTOW and so pays an OEW and WF penalty for having 
excess capacity that is not used. Even so, the benefit from staging is a significant 17% increase in PRE, due solely to 
the change in operation.  
 
Figure 7. Top View Geometry 
Comparison between Boeing 777-
200HG, Hahn Optimistic Redesign, 
and Hahn Realistic Redesign 
aircraft. 
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Figure 8. Payload Range Efficiency as a function of Design Range for Hahn Redesigned aircraft. 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Payload Range Efficiency as a function of Design Range for All Three Studies. 
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The Boeing 737-900 is included as another point of reference that represents a vehicle with no modeling error. It 
nearly meets the 5,000 km stage length at MTOW and so can be considered to be nearly optimal for this stage length. 
There are several problems with making direct comparisons though. The Boeing 737-900 is a very different aircraft 
than the Boeing 777-200HG. It is much smaller and slower, has a less efficient engine, and is more cramped with 2 
class accommodations. Still, one might assume that a Boeing 777-200HG class aircraft could do as well when 
redesigned optimally for the 5,000 km stage length. 
The Hahn Realistic aircraft family uses a baseline that was tuned and optimally designed to be the same as the 
Boeing 777-200HG. By tuning the model, modeling error at this point is eliminated. While this tuning is no 
guarantee that there will not be significant modeling error introduced when redesigning to the shorter stage lengths, 
it does provide a solid anchor from which to proceed. Indeed, a significant modeling error was found in the Hahn 
Optimistic redesign and corrected on the Hahn Realistic redesign aircraft. While there is no conclusive proof that 
this design is accurate, it does have a PRE similar to the B737-900, which was as expected. 
Nangia’s 15,000 km stage length aircraft has a PRE that is quite similar to that of the Boeing 777-200HG 
validation aircraft, which is encouraging. However, Nangia’s 5,000 km stage length aircraft has nearly double the 
PRE of the Boeing 737-900 reference aircraft.  
Green and Nangia both agree on the maximum PRE attainable at 5,000 km, but disagree strongly at 15,000 km.  
Given that Nangia has used a similar analysis to Green and has both identified and corrected errors in Green’s 
analysis, I can only assume that these errors make Green’s results unreliable.  
This still leaves the large difference between Nangia’s 5,000 km aircraft and the Hahn Realistic redesign 
unexplained. One potential source of error that may be inadvertently skewing the results may be an artifact of 
Nangia’s historical regressions of weight fractions and technology constants. Given the extremely sparse data 
available for regressions, the tendency is to use it all even if it may constitute a wide range of technology levels or 
harbor hidden assumptions. As an example, short-range aircraft tend to be more densely loaded than long-range 
aircraft. This is because passengers are willing to endure lower comfort levels for short periods of time to get a 
lower ticket price, and the aircraft tend to carry cargo whenever conditions permit to maximize revenue. Figure 10 
shows additional Boeing aircraft as well as loadings for the same aircraft to illustrate this point.  
 
 
Figure 10. Payload Range Efficiency as a function of Design Range for Boeing Aircraft. 
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The extreme example of varying loading to raise PRE is the domestic variant of the Boeing 747-400, which can 
hold up to 628 passengers in 1-class accommodation. This strategy limits the maximum stage length to just 1,575 
km, but yields a good PRE of 5,052 km. The Boeing 747-400LR, on the other hand, holds just 400 passengers at a 
stage length of 13,334 km, yielding a rather poor PRE of 3,211 km.  It appears that the B747-400 has been pushed to 
the limits of its technology, which has exaggerated the PRE penalty to an exceptional 57% increase for single stage 
operation. (Fig. 10) Of course, the B747-400 was not chosen for the validation aircraft precisely because of these 
and other issues. For example, one wonders how the passengers would feel about being loaded onto that cramped 
aircraft for the ninth time to finish their 15,000 km trip. 
The Boeing 777-200HG 2-class aircraft also illustrates that higher PRE is possible if the passengers are willing 
to sacrifice some comfort. While nowhere near as cramped as the B747-400 Domestic, this aircraft also shows a 
greater PRE than the Hahn Realistic optimally redesigned aircraft, which maintains the baseline’s 3-class 
accommodation. This is an expected result. It can be shown that the denser an aircraft is, the more efficient it is. 
Passengers constitute a very low-density load, so any improvements here are likely to have a greater impact on PRE 
than anything else. Simply put, a kg of passenger has very different multi-disciplinary impacts on the aircraft than a 
kg of cargo or fuel. Since drag is proportional to wetted area, the denser cargo and fuel loads constitute less of a 
penalty to carry. Indeed, the wing usually has excess fuel volume available for all but the longest stage lengths, so 
parasite drag remains unchanged as fuel is added. Also, fuel is a particularly efficient mass to carry. Higher 
passenger and cargo weight is concentrated on the centerline, which raises wing bending moments. Fuel can be 
contained entirely in the wing, which reduces wing bending moments. While there is a tendency to trade these 
masses off one for one, this can add a high degree of error into the analysis that can lead to erroneous conclusions. 
Extending the trend to the 1-class loading, we see that the PRE is improved still more, although significantly lower 
than Nangia’s estimate. Taking this train of thought to its logical conclusion, I loaded the Boeing 777-200HG for a 
takeoff at a payload that yielded Maximum Zero Fuel Weight (MZFW). This loading is equivalent to that of 598 
passengers and their baggage being somehow accommodated in the current fuselage. This unrealistic loading 
yielded a PRE very similar to Nangia’s estimate, which indicates that either his payload makeup (denser cargo being 
added) or his accommodation (passenger density) is changing as stage length changes. Because of the course nature 
of the high level regressions used, it is difficult to say what is driving the result.  
While it is clear that this level of PRE is attainable for short stage lengths, is this a valid result for this study? 
The only way to achieve the PRE predicted by Nangia at a fixed payload weight is to substitute denser cargo for 
passengers and/or reduce passenger comfort. It is undesirable for the airline to substitute low value cargo for high 
value passengers, as this would reduce revenue. It is undesirable for the passenger to endure more cramped 
accommodation because the total time spent on the aircraft is actually higher when staging than not. While the first 
stage may be bearable, each successive stage will become less so, unless the passengers are allowed to disembark at 
the end of each stage for a reasonable time period. Even so, the cumulative effect of spending more time on the trip 
and more time in the more cramped aircraft will probably more than offset any efficiency increase. Also, the greatest 
benefit only occurs at passenger densities that are illegal because egress requirements in the Federal Air Regulations 
could not be met.  
Since this level of PRE is only possible if some of the original equality constraints of the study are violated, I 
feel that the results from the Hahn Realistic redesign are the most valid. The final results are: making the trip in one 
stage instead of three required OEW to increase by 41%, TOW to increase by 82%, and WFB to increase by 29%. 
The PRE results are that the single stage aircraft attained 3,773 km, while the three stage aircraft attained 4,883 km. 
It is interesting to compare these results of redesign to those available through operation only. The Boeing 777-
200HG 3-class aircraft results are: making the trip in one stage instead of three required OEW to increase by 0%, 
TOW to increase by 42%, and WFB to increase by 17%. The PRE results are that the single stage attained 3,715 km, 
while the three stage aircraft attained 4,340 km.  
Therefore, approximately half of the total improvement to PRE from operating with three stages is due to the 
operational improvement and half is due to redesigning the aircraft to take advantage of this new operation. 
It is also important to realize that this is an optimistic, academic study that assumes that usable airports are 
placed at even intervals along the flight path in still air. As any of these conditions varies from the ideal, the 
potential benefits from staging will erode. 
D. Negative Aspects of Staging 
These studies have focused on the benefits of staging airliner service with a very simple metric, PRE. There are 
also many reasons why staging is undesirable. While I have not quantified all of these negative aspects, they bear 
mentioning.  
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First, there will be a negative impact on safety. While there are many hazards that the airline industry overcomes 
with stunning effectiveness, a great deal of their success can be traced to the fact that most airline flights fly above 
and avoid through route planning, most serious weather conditions. By requiring the airliner to descend through the 
lower atmosphere to a fixed location, the airlines lose this advantage. Also, the takeoff and landing phases are by far 
the riskiest phases of the flight, which are tripled by staging.  
Second, total travel time is increased. Even if the system runs perfectly, this is a direct result of increasing the 
proportion of time spent in climb, descent, approach, taxi, and layover. The block time for the single stage aircraft is 
17.18 hours, while the block time for the three stage aircraft is three times 6.00 hours, or 18 hours. Even considering 
unusual operations, the additional time to refuel would be at least 30 minutes per stage. For a three stage trip, this 
will add one hour to the block time, yielding a total of 19 hours. Experience with international flights has shown that 
layovers of three hours are common, while layovers of six hours are not uncommon. The potential for greatly 
increasing the trip time is clearly undesirable. 
Third, terminal area noise and emissions pollution is increased. Since the staged aircraft is smaller, both its 
individual noise and emissions signatures are likely to be reduced, but not by a factor of three. Since the takeoffs and 
landings are tripled, terminal area pollution must go up significantly. 
Fourth, schedules will be much more susceptible to unplanned delays. Airlines already have a great deal of 
trouble dealing with disruption due to weather, congestion, and mechanical trouble. All of these are more prevalent 
at the terminal areas than they are enroute. Tripling the takeoffs and landings will much more than triple the 
likelihood of delays from these sources. 
Last, the staged aircraft will either be less durable or heavier and costlier than my estimate indicates. This is 
because one factor that I don’t control for is the effect of fatigue cycles. Both the airframe and engine are susceptible 
to the number of load cycles that they experience. In the case of the airframe, the fuselage is pressurized and 
depressurized on each flight. For the staged aircraft, there are three times the cycles per trip and either the fuselage 
will have to be strengthened for this duty or its life will be only one third of the single stage aircraft. This is far from 
an academic theory. Island hopping airlines such as Aloha Airlines and JAL have experienced catastrophic fatigue 
failures in their fuselages. Also, the staged aircraft’s wings will be exposed to the turbulence of the lower 
atmosphere more. This means that they will be put through more and greater magnitude load cycles, which will 
require structural reinforcement. Last, the engines of the staged aircraft will be subjected to more full throttle 
operation during takeoff, effectively tripling the number of cycles and length of time at full throttle per trip.  
These serious issues all reduce the attractiveness of staging airliner service. The benefits of staging have to be 
substantially more important than these penalties for an airline and aircraft manufacturer to be willing to adopt 
staging as an operational model. It is unclear as to whether the idealistic 29% fuel saving of the Hahn Realistic 
redesign aircraft is enough to justify staging. 
III. New Design Metrics 
The other main hypothesis put forward by Nangia is that the new emphasis on cost and pollution requires new 
metrics to ensure balanced designs. Nangia correctly points out that PRE is narrowly focused and proposed two new 
metrics that should be better. The first is the Nangia Value Efficiency parameter, VEOPX, which he claims is a 
measure where, “Higher value is better for lower structure weight, costs (acquisition and operating) and landing 
noise.” The second is the Nangia Emissions Efficiency parameter, VEMPX, where, “Higher value is better for lower 
noise emissions, and operating costs.” I will not comment on these claims, but a further investigation of VEMPX will 
highlight an important point. 
A fundamental difference between the Analytic Analysis approach and the Numerical Analysis approach is not 
so much that one uses non-dimensionalization while the other doesn’t, but rather the level at which the non-
dimensionalization takes place. The desire to non-dimensionalize is understandable; however, it should be 
understood that the very act of non-dimensionalization discards scale information in an attempt to find similarities to 
exploit. When done at a high level, the tendency is toward redundant information, rather than capturing new degrees 
of freedom. 
When Nangia wanted to increase the degrees of freedom for his new design metric, he collected PRE, the linear 
coefficient of the Breguet Range Equation, and payload fraction to create the non-dimensional metric VEMPX,   
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where PRE is defined in Eq. (2), X is defined in Eq. (3), WP is the Weight of the Payload, and MTOW is the 
Maximum TakeOff Weight. 
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where PRE is the Payload Range Efficiency, R is the aircraft Range, and WFB is the Weight of Fuel, Block.  
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where X is the linear coefficient of the Breguet Range Equation, V is the flight Velocity, L is the aircraft Lift, SFC is 
defined in Eq. (6), and D is the aircraft Drag.  
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L = MTOW  (4) 
 
 TD =  (5), 
 
where T is Thrust. Equations (4) and (5) are very common substitutions, which are valid under steady state, 
unaccelerated flight conditions such as cruise. Essentially, Eq. (4) sets lift equal to weight while Eq. (5) sets drag 
equal to thrust. 
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where SFC is the Specific Fuel Consumption, and tB is time, Block.  
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Substituting Eqs. (4) – (6) into Eq. (3) and simplifying yields Eq. (7). 
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Substituting Eq. (8) into Eq. (7) and simplifying yields Eq. (9). 
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! 
VEMPX = PayloadFraction( )
2
 (10) 
 
Substituting Eq. (9) into Eq. (1) yields Eq. (10). VEMPX simplifies to the well-known non-dimensional metric of 
payload fraction, but in this case it is squared.  
The preceding analysis illustrates how parameters that are non-dimensionalized at a high level may appear to 
have different degrees of freedom, but in reality often do not.  
Instead of devising new non-dimensional metrics to capture the multi-disciplinary nature of balanced aircraft 
design, we at NASA have taken advantage of the optimization capability of our Numerical Analysis approach. The 
balance comes from the flexible interplay of a multitude of small disciplinary analyses, while subject to constraints, 
to minimize a specific Objective function. Historically, we have minimized TOW, as it had a strong correlation with 
Life Cycle Cost (LCC), and this was the Objective used in this study. As the conditions that prompted Green and 
Nangia to pursue the possibility of staging, namely increasing fuel prices and concern about Global Climate Change, 
become a reality, the correlation between TOW and LCC is becoming less valid. I agree that a new Objective needs 
to be found that better represents the new reality. What we need is to find an objective with intrinsic value that takes 
into account the economic challenges that will drive airliner manufacturers’ and operators’ decisions to ensure that 
the technologies and operations proposed are attractive to them. 
IV. Conclusion 
Two main Nangia hypotheses have been investigated. The first hypothesis, concerning the likely fuel 
consumption benefits from the staging of airliner service has been quantified, and my results indicate that using 
three stages for a total of 15,000 km would likely yield a 17% improvement from operation alone, a further 12% 
improvement from redesign for the 5,000 km stage length, resulting in a total possible improvement of 29%. This 
result differs substantially from the previous work of Green and Nangia. While I can not be certain as to why this is, 
results using published Boeing payload-range diagrams indicate that the previous work may not have controlled for 
payload density, skewing their results.  
While it is likely that staging airliner service can save a substantial amount of fuel, there are serious negative 
impacts that have not been quantified. The greater the fuel savings, the greater the likelihood that staging will 
overcome these negative impacts. Given that my best estimate is less than a third of the earlier estimates, the 
likelihood that staging will still be attractive is significantly diminished. 
The second hypothesis, concerning the development of new, high level, non-dimensional metrics to promote 
more balanced aircraft design has been examined, and it is shown that there are inherent pitfalls to this approach. 
While non-dimensionalization is a useful technique when applied to low level analyses, there is a tendency towards 
seemingly unrelated metrics having redundant information at high levels. This tendency toward high level 
redundancy is shown through the specific example of the simplification of the proposed Nangia Emissions 
Efficiency parameter, VEMPX, to the well-known non-dimensional parameter of payload fraction, squared.  
The basic approaches of Analytic Analysis and Numerical Analysis are compared on this specific study. Both 
approaches have strengths and weaknesses, but the transparency and flexibility of the Numerical Analysis approach 
promotes the discovery of errors and understanding of how parameters are driving the result as well as allowing for 
tighter control over the study’s execution. 
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